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A Turkish Muslim Between Islamism
and Turkish Nationalism: Seyyid Ahmet
Arvasi [1932–88]
O¨MER ASLAN
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT Notwithstanding his enormous influence on the grassroots of the Turkish nation-
alist movement in its Islamic turn in the 1970s, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi, a staunch nationalist and
a pious Muslim at the same time, has remained an understudied intellectual. His oeuvre is left
largely unexplored. He is either too simply associated with Tu¨rk-I˙slam Sentezi [Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis] or treated as if the sole outcome of his intellectual labor was his three-
volume Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨ [Turkish-Islamic Ideal]. This article seeks to remedy this situation
by studying critically his views on the particular issue of Turkish nationalism and Islam nexus
based on his writings in their entirety.
Introduction
When Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc¸i Hareket Partisi, MHP) was criticized by a
newspaper columnist for racism, a leading Turkish nationalist tried to counter the
charge by referring to Seyyid [Sayyid]1 Ahmet Arvasi, who claimed that he rejected
racism and professed to be, at one and the same time, a fervent Turkish nationalist and
a Muslim.2 Arvasi, however, is scarcely known outside nationalist circles in Turkey.
Overwhelming portion of what has been written about him is biographies and eulo-
gies.3 The dearth of scholarly work on Arvasi4 is striking given the acknowledgment
of the influence he wielded through his Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨ [Turkish-Islamic Ideal,
TII] formulation on the Turkish nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s.5
The scant attention paid to Arvasi can be explained by the uneven emphasis accorded
to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis [TIS] developed and propagated by the Aydınlar Ocag˘ı
[Intellectuals’ Hearth]. This lopsided focus subsumed Arvasi under the all-too-easy
rubric of TIS. In the only monograph on Arvasi, for example, Copeaux treated the
TII and TIS as identical and regarded Arvasi as a TIS ideologue.6 The unwarranted
reliance in occasional writings on solely his book Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨, a collection of
Arvasi’s newspaper columns, at the expense of the sizable rest of his entire
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intellectual labor does not help the case either. Hence, the first objective of this paper
is to unearth the TII from the deadweight of TIS. This would help dispel the mon-
opoly TIS clamped on variations of Turkish nationalism and Islam nexus in
Turkey in the second half of the 20th century.
The following objective of this paper emanates from Arvasi’s dilemmas as an
ideologue with loyalties to both the nation and the ummah, which appear to be
more competing than complementary.7 Trying to keep his allegiances to both entities
Arvasi put himself in a situation where he had to answer the question a Muslim Arab
nationalist had posed some decades earlier: Is it possible for one of us to be a loyal
nationalist and a sincere Muslim, at one and the same time? Is there a fundamental
contradiction between Arab nationalism in its precise scientific sense and true
Muslim feeling? Does a contradiction and opposition lie in our saying “This man
is a nationalist Muslim” or “This man is a Muslim nationalist,” as when we say,
“This man is an atheist believer” or “He is a religious atheist’ . . . ?”8 Arvasi did
not hesitate to answer this question in the negative. But did he experience any
tension between these loyalties? If he did, how did he resolve the conflict between
Islam as a universal religion and nationalism as a particular phenomenon? Did he
fall into any contradiction while demonstrating compatibility between Islam and
nationalism? Did his loyalty to the ummah amount to Islamism?
The overall discussion around these questions has significant bearings on the latest
debates on the issue of religion and nationalism nexus in nationalism studies. A
growing number of scholars argue against the replacement model today, which
describes the relationship between religion and nationalism as one wherein national-
ism replaces religion.9 Instead, researchers in this field opt for adopting a more
nuanced approach and seek modes of religion and nationalism connection.10 One
of these modes common to both Turkish nationalism and Arab nationalism (to its
both qawmiyya and wataniyya varieties) is parochialization of Islam. “Much of the
emotional power of nationalism in the Muslim world comes from the capacity of
national movements to parochialize Islam and channel the force of Muslim faith
into national commitments.”11 Because Arvasi follows the same path and Turkifies
Islam, albeit for the second time and on religious ground this time, this paper cautions
against discarding the replacement model.
Arvasi and Islamic Turn in Turkish Nationalism
Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi was born in 1932 in Dog˘ubeyazıt, Ag˘rı in Eastern Anatolia. His
father Abdu¨lhakim Arvasi, a public servant at the Turkish customs, should not be
confused with famous Naqshbandiyya muse Sheikh Seyyid Abdu¨lhakim Arvasi
(1865–43), a later spiritual guide to famous Turkish poet and Islamist thinker
Necip Fazıl Kısaku¨rek.12 Notwithstanding his ethnic Arab origins, Arvasi was an
ardent Turkish nationalist. His unofficial affiliation with the MHP must have been
a few years before the 1969 General Convention of the Republican Villager
Nation Party (Cumhuriyetc¸i Ko¨ylu¨ Millet Partisi, CMKP), a precursor to the MHP.
He was involved in the intra-party debate concerning the new official emblem of
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the party before that convention and picked the three crescents when Alparslan
Tu¨rkes¸, the party’s leader, asked his opinion.13 His very first book, The Principles
of Advanced Turkish Nationalism (I˙leri Tu¨rk Milliyetc¸ilig˘inin I˙lkeleri), was published
in National Action (Milli Hareket) in 1965. More important was Arvasi’s contribution
to the expansion of the Islamic tone in Tu¨rkes¸’s doctrine of Nine Lights (Dokuz Is¸ık).
He wrote columns under the title “Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨” in Hergu¨n, the party’s official
print, as well as in U¨lku¨cu¨ Kadro.14 Teaching at I˙stanbul Atatu¨rk Institute of Edu-
cation (I˙stanbul Atatu¨rk Eg˘itim Enstitu¨su¨), a then Idealist stronghold, had put
Arvasi inside “the first circle of the movement.”15 Arvasi officially joined the
MHP in 1979 after being selected to MHP’s General Executive Board (Genel
I˙dare Kurulu) upon his nomination by his Islam-leaning fellows without his prior
knowledge.16 With these facilitators at his disposal, though, Arvasi was mostly influ-
ential at the grassroots level.17
When Arvasi joined the MHP, Islam had already started to become publicly more
visible in Turkey. As is well known, the early Republican elite wanted to create a
national identity on secular foundations, namely common language and history.18
Islam, by the same token, was to be pushed back to the absolute privacy of individual
conscience.19 The early Kemalist elite, partly in the footsteps of nationalist ideologue
Ziya Go¨kalp,20 sought a nationalized religion a` la Protestant nations of the West after
the Reformation. Go¨kalp had wanted the Qur’an and the adhan (Islamic call for
prayer) to be read in Turkish. If not the actual prayer, he wished that hutbas
(sermons) and invocations read in the mosque would be in Turkish.21 Following only
some of Go¨kalp’s suggestions, the Republic upended the Caliphate, adopted the
Latin alphabet, founded the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to Turkify and
“etatise religion”22 solicited Turkish translations of Qur’an and made Turkish the
language of call for prayer and sermons. The ultimate objective of this essentially
top-down exercise in nation building was to construct a secular Turkish nation,23
whose citizens would believe in a “personal religion.”24 After Ataturk’s death, the
hitherto suppressed or marginalized groups started to come to the fore. One of these
groups, the Racist–Turanist stream in Turkish nationalism dominated the nationalist
discourse in the 1940s and the 1950s. Their criticism of official nationalist position
was not directed against the secular nature of Kemalist nationalism though; they only
wanted to make it more radical and more exclusionary against non-Turkish races.25
The multiparty democracy period of the 1950s marked the era of Islamic revival.26
In the face of a mighty opposition after the transition to multiparty system in 1946, the
ruling CHP reevaluated its policy on religion. The Democratic Party government fol-
lowing the 1950 elections allowed pilgrimage and the call for prayers to be read in
Arabic again. Qur’an readings over the state radio started and formerly elective reli-
gion courses became mandatory unless the parents filed a petition for exemption. The
budget allocated for the Directorate of Religious Affairs increased. The number of
I˙mam Hatip schools rose.27 This made at least some Turkish nationalists realize
that Turks blended so well with Islam for the last 12 centuries that secular nationalism
of either the early Republican era or the racist/Turanists failed to win hearts of ordin-
ary Turks.
Turkish Muslim Between Islamism and Turkish Nationalism 521
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The trajectory of the “National Doctrine: Nine Lights” (Milli Doktrin: Dokuz Is¸ık)
as expressed first in 1960 by Alparslan Tu¨rkes¸ might give an interesting way to follow
this momentous discursive shift in Turkish nationalism. When Tu¨rkes¸ first announced
this doctrine as guidance for Turkish nationalism, Moralism (Ahlakc¸ılık) as one of its
nine principles was very brief and lacked a single reference to Islam.28 The more
Islamic-oriented nationalists inside the party such as Ahmet Er, Seyyid Ahmet
Arvasi, Erol Gu¨ngo¨r, and Ahmet Bu¨yu¨k Karabacak considered the doctrine as unsa-
tisfactory to be a moral compass for the Idealist Youth.29 With contributions by these
names, Moralism principle accentuated Islam’s role in the formation of Turkish
morals in later editions.30 There were other manifestations of the Islamic turn in
the MHP. In a preelection speech delivered on radio on behalf of the CKMP,
Ahmet Er called the Turkish nation, the Army of God, which had always “com-
manded the good and forbidden the evil,” to awaken and re-fulfill its historic
mission.31 Only four years after taking over the CKMP in August 1965, Tu¨rkes¸
and his friends changed the name of their party to Nationalist Action Party as well
as its emblem from gray wolf to “Three Crescents” in its 1969 Convention. In the
run up to the 1977 elections, Tu¨rkes¸ announced “Turkish nationalism with a spiritual
content” as the MHP worldview. Nationalism, it was claimed, was subordinate to
Islam.32 Tu¨rkes¸ himself performed the Hajj little before the 1977 general elections.
One of the promises the party made in its 1977 election declaration was “saving
the ‘Turkish pride and consciousness and Islamic morality and virtues’ from any
abuse and damage and letting it live in men’s hearts.”33
Uneasiness with Arvasi Inside the MHP
When Tu¨rkes¸ seized control of the CMKP he was yet distant toward Islam.34 Despite
the increasing tone of Islam in his rhetoric, in the following years, Tu¨rkes¸ still thought
that even though they are not against the idea of a religious ideal per se, Islam is not
the cause of their struggle.35 It should be kept in mind that, in contrast to Tu¨rkes¸ and
the MHP, Arvasi was already writing poems with Islamic tones years before becom-
ing known around nationalist circles.36 Arvasi’s Islamic orientation created some
troubles for him inside the party administration. The cold shoulder Arvasi is said
to have been given inside the party elite in the wake 1977 elections37 might have
been due to his support for the publication of Nizam-ı Alem weekly. S¸ura (Consul-
tation), an Islamist weekly, condemned all nationalisms, whether it is Kurdism,
Turkism or Arabism. It suggested the Sharia as the only path to salvation.38
Nizam-I Alem came out in 1979 with a near-Islamist discourse to respond to these
and other anti-nationalist denunciations expressed by Sebil (the Path) and S¸ura week-
lies by the motto of“Mu¨slu¨manların I˙ttihadı” (the Union of Muslims).39 Its second
issue announced Idealists’ opposition to the interest rate.40 It also issued a call for
contributions to the weekly from all Muslims. Among the intellectuals and writers
pieces solicited from were Mehmet S¸evket Eygi (an Islamic writer/columnist),
Necip Fazıl Kısaku¨rek [arguably the most influential Islamist of the time, also a
big influence on Arvasi], Ahmed Davudog˘lu (an Alim educated at Al-Azhar), and
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Sezai Karakoc¸ (a famous Islamic poet and a major influence on Idealists).41 The
weekly became a stage where pieces by Bediu¨zzaman Said Nursi, some local
sheikhs from the Southeast and, of course, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi were published.
The impact of the weekly was enormous.
Upon its publication some Akıncıs expressed their euphoria because the separation
between the Akıncıs and U¨lku¨cu¨s would end now.42 However, the MHP Tribunal
Commission [MHP Divan Kurulu] closed down Nizam-I Alem. This caused a
serious discord between Arvasi and Tu¨rkes¸.43 Arvasi decided to resign from the
party but was persuaded to stay.44 Given the gradual deepening of the rift between
the Islamizing grassroots and the statist and more secular party elite, the trouble
Nizam-I Alem caused for the MHP was not surprising. When the party elite realized
that they could no longer contain the degree of Islamization among the Idealists, they
started a process of internal cleansing.45 This assessment is supported by the fact that
Tu¨rkes¸ had also banned other weeklies with a similar emphasis on Islam.46 After the
1980 coup d’etat, Arvasi became one of those prosecuted in the MHP and Idealist
Foundations Case (MHP ve U¨lku¨cu¨ Kurulus¸lar Davası). He continued to root for
the MHP after he exited the jail but he tellingly wrote not in an Idealist outlet but
in more nationalist-conservative Tu¨rkiye Gazetesi until his death in 1988.
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
Islam’s return to Turkish nationalism was partly a consequence of changes in the
international system. With the dawn of the Cold War and the looming communist
threat, the Turkish right deemed Islam a dear asset to tap into. Against the bourgeon-
ing communist/atheist threat that they perceived nationalists of various stripes held on
to Islam so as to make a common front. The institutional backdrop to “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis” rested on this conjuncture. One of the first associations founded
was Association of Turkish Nationalists (Tu¨rk Milliyetc¸iler Derneg˘i) founded in
1950–51 and the Club of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Kulubu¨) in 1961. Aydınlar
Kulu¨bu¨ became a platform for discussion between nationalists and the more Islam-
oriented nationalist.47 Turkish Hearths (Tu¨rk Ocakları) was founded in 1965. Scien-
tific Seminary of Nationalists convened in 1967 and sought ways to find common
ground between nationalists. In 1968, the Idealist Hearts (U¨lku¨ Ocakları) was estab-
lished. The Second Scientific Convention of the Nationalists (Milliyetc¸iler I˙lmi Kur-
ultayı) gathered in 1969 at the MTTB’s (Milli Tu¨rk Talebe Birlig˘i-National Turkish
Students Union) Hall.48 The declaration of that convention laid out some groundwork
of themes that a decade later would come to characterize the TIS: “Turkish nation was
picked by God to shepherd all other nations and Turks embraced Islam because it was
most congruent with their national character.”49 Finally, Hearth of the Enlightened
(Aydınlar Ocag˘ı), the loci of the TIS, was founded in 1970. The aim of the Hearth
was to unite the nationalists against the “rampant left.” In order to reach a compro-
mise among Turkists and more conservative-minded nationalists, TIS based on a
watered down version of Islam was developed.50
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In an attempt to create a common ideology in Turkey, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
aimed at achieving solidarity between conservatives and Turkish nationalists, gath-
ering all ethnic groups in Turkey under the umbrella of Turkish nationalism. The
TIS rested on the idea that “Turkish Islam” was one of the foundations of national
unity.51
The Hearth expanded its sphere of influence at the state level after the 1980 coup
d’e´tat. It was privileged enough to present its draft constitution to the National Secur-
ity Council in 1982 when no outside institution was allowed to make any proposals
for the new Constitution. It issued a call for “National Consensuses” in 1986 and was
able to have its ideas accepted in the “National Culture Report” the State Planning
Organization prepared. Thus, the Hearth managed to influence national education
and national culture policies through their affiliated bureaucrats at the State Planning
Organization (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı) and the Supreme Institution of Atatu¨rk
Culture, Language and History (Atatu¨rk Ku¨ltu¨r Dil ve Tarih Yu¨ksek Kurumu).52
An official report on national culture program stipulated that state’s culture policy
should re-rest on and protect “national culture” formed by true Central Asian
values and Islam.53 Nevertheless, neither Islamists nor Leftists were happy with
the official sanction given to TIS ideology.54
TIS maintained a basic argument: Islam became an inseparable element of Turkish
identity over ages. Since pre-Islamic Turks had a monotheistic religion, they
believed in the aftermath, were fond of justice and order and respected moral
codes and family, Islam provided the “perfect dress for the Turkish body.”55
However, the role cut for Islam in the TIS remains subject to the charge of instru-
mental use of religion by nationalists as expressed by Greenfeld.56 Although Çetin-
saya claimed that “Intellectuals’ Hearth” followed Ziya Go¨kalp’s thinking on
religion and I˙brahim Kafesog˘lu and Muharrem Ergin [as two leading exponents of
the TIS] considered Islam as indispensable in thinking about Turks’ national
culture,57 Kafesog˘lu and Ergin’s writings say otherwise. I˙brahim Kafesog˘lu, the
first President of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, argued back in 1957 Tu¨rkler ve Medeniyet
that the kind of Islam Turks needed in the future was an Islam shorn of some worn-
out ideas and hurafas (“unlawful” religious innovation).58 Islam can satisfy Turks’
need for a religion as long as it remained a “matter of individual conscience.”59 He is
also careful to point out that since the time Turkishness and Islam began to syn-
thesize Turks never founded an Islamic State because Turks kept their pre-Islamic
Turkish understanding of sovereignty, social rights, and toleration in religious life,
land regime and the military character for their states.60 According to Muharrem
Ergin, after the past ages of religions, it is now the age of cultures. “In the age of
nationalisms, religions’ pressure on other elements of culture disappears . . . Reli-
gions now take their true place as one [but not the dominant] of elements of
Turkish culture.”61 The proponents of TIS quickly argue that some pre-Islamic prac-
tices of Turks were major contributions to Islam. In terms of women rights, for
instance, they maintain, “Islam learned from Turks’ more advanced principles.”62
One therefore feels that Islam in the TIS is accommodated only as “an additional
motivation” for nationalism.63
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Arvasi and Turkish-Islamic Ideal
Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi shares the view of the TIS on the historical roots of the Turkish
nation and inseparability of Islam and Turkishness. After all, despite all his objections
to the usage of the word “Synthesis” Arvasi continued to use Tu¨rk-I˙slam Sentezi, even
if only for strategic reasons.64 Arvasi leaves no doubt that he had a primordialist view
of origins of nationalism and nations. For him, “history is a history of nations.” Maps
showing nations all around the world are not a modern phenomenon; they have been
so since the ancient ages.65 Arvasi does not think that nations are constructed,
invented or imagined entities. “Nations have always been around and history consists
of nations’ adventures and relations. Both history, ethnology, and sociology have
proved that nations and nationalisms are objective realities.”66 Arvasi finds the
origins of the Turkish nation in Central Asian steppes, where a nation with “small
bodies and wide foreheads were riding horses around 2500 or 1700 BC.”67
Notwithstanding these similarities between the TIS and Arvasi, there remains some
significant nuances between them. To start with, the Intellectuals’ Hearth started as an
elite club. It did not connect with the grassroots nationalist movement. “The grassroots
was so at odds with the members of the Hearth over their elitism and political fickle-
ness that, in some protests, copies of Ortadog˘u [Middle East] newspaper, wherein
members of the Hearth wrote, were set on fire.”68 Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi, nevertheless,
was a modest teacher for many years in distant corners of the country, held in high
esteem in the eyes of the grassroots. Arvasi allocated a great amount of time and
space to spread Islamic morality and Islamic prayers among the U¨lku¨cu¨ youth.69 It
is not for nothing therefore that Arvasi was neither one of the founders of the Aydınlar
Kulu¨bu¨ [Intellectuals’ Club] nor among those who frequented it upon its founding.70
The fact that secularism was kept intact and never compromised in the TIS71 increased
its acceptability at the state level after the 1980 coup d’e´tat. However, Arvasi never
praises Turks for contributing to Islam in terms of secularism. In his view the sole
yardstick whereby the rest of the components of Turkish culture are either allowed
or rejected can be Islam. He argues that everything, secular and sacred, inherited
from the pre-Islamic Turkish customs must go through the filter of Islam’s higher com-
mands and prohibitions. Only then, for instance, Turkish to¨re can be maintained.72 In
brief, unlike Kafesog˘lu and Ergin, who took Islam as auxiliary to Turkish nationalism,
Arvasi declares Islam as the superior-system (u¨st-sistem).
Arvasi embraced Islam as a total lifestyle.73 He even wrote I˙lm-i Hal, a Muslim’s
guide for an everyday life, the knowledge of correct Muslim behavior. In major oppo-
sition to Kafesog˘lu, who argued that “Turkish nationalism is not racism but it is not
about a religious cause either,”74 Arvasi made Turks’ raison d’etre defending the
cause of Islam on earth. Arvasi’s usage of the word U¨lku¨ [Ideal] in “Tu¨rk-I˙slam
U¨lku¨su¨” already points at a holy Ideal for the Turks. This Ideal consists of two inter-
related missions: I˙’lay-ı Kelimetillah, defense of the superiority of the Qur’an, and
Nizam-ı Alem, making God’s commands and standards of measure reign supreme
in the world.75 It may be claimed, however, that these missions Arvasi assigns the
Turkish nation is what a nationalist would do. It only marks a “missionary
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chosenness” for the Turkish nation. In other words, Arvasi does not stray from the
nationalist credo when he suggests that the Turkish nation is entrusted with the reli-
gious task of protecting and expanding the Islamic realm.76 As correct as this
interpretation is we should still bear in mind that neither the MHP nor the chief pro-
ponents of the TIS ideology could ascribe a religious ideal to Turkish nationalism.
Arvasi, an Islamist?
If Arvasi’s emphasis on Islam went way beyond the limited role cut for Islam in the
TIS formulation, would it then be right to consider Arvasi an Islamist, as many came
to be suspicious of him inside the top MHP elite? Here too Arvasi’s views do not
allow an easy answer. While he sounds like an archetype Islamist in certain
aspects, his staunch nationalism, views on racism and objection against intermar-
riages among Turks and non-Turks make it hard to describe him an Islamist.
It is consensus that though Islamism is a modern ideology.77 Islamism is a “politi-
cal ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic govern-
ment, understood as government which implements the shari’a (Islamic law).”78 It is
claimed that what distinguishes “Islamists” from “Muslims” is that they are not sat-
isfied with Islam playing a role only at the individual level. They want religion to be a
factor at the community and state levels as well.79 Thus, Islamists declare absolute
sovereignty of God and demand the implementation of Shari’a, God’s law, as the
Constitution of the state. They also view nationalism as a Western contrivance to
divide and rule Muslims, hence an obstacle before the revival of the Caliphate.80
Truly, Arvasi impresses his readers as an Islamist when he argues that Islam
already defended modern human rights such as religious freedom, safety of life
and property XIV centuries ago during the Prophet’s lifetime and that Prophet’s fare-
well sermon was already a declaration of human rights.81 Then, he too declares that
sovereignty belongs to God. Yet, he does not deem democracy as a breach of God’s
sovereignty. For God’s sovereignty realizes itself on earth through popularly elected
officials. Popular sovereignty is the medium for God’s sovereignty to reign on earth.
As long as “the believers elect their own government officials based on their own will,
in the light of higher principles that they believe, exalt and want to live under” democ-
racies create no trouble in front of God’s sovereignty. If both the ruled and the ruler
obey the commands and principles God revealed, there will be no hegemony or
sovereignty of either over the other.82 Yet, Islamists rarely, if they ever do, defend
nationalism. For most Islamists, nationalism is the means to partition the ummah
into nation-states.83 Yet again, Arvasi was a proud nationalist as fervent as to
declare that “he would have been a Turkish nationalist even if he was born with
the same mental faculties in North Africa.”84 And like most Turkish nationalists he
too felt as compelled as other nationalists in the Muslim world to establish his
bona fides with Islam.85 Arvasi pursued a three-pronged approach to prove Islamicity
of nationalism: he presented “evidence” from an array of verses in the Qur’an,
selected Hadith and Prophet’s companions. Arvasi assumes the mantle of authority
to interpret some ayahs in Surah Hujurat86 and Romans to justify nationalism.87
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Arvasi adds to aforementioned ayahs some such sayings attributed to Prophet
Muhammad that “a person cannot be reproached for loving his tribe,” “hubb al-
watan min al-iman” (Love of one’s native land is a part of one’s Faith), and “the
leader of the tribe is he who serves his tribe best.”88 Finally, according to Arvasi,
the fact that Prophet’s companions were referred with their ethnic origins such as
Bilal al-Habashi [Bilal the Abyssinian] and Salman al-Farisi [Salman the Persian]
also indicates that nationalism is not forbidden in Islam.89
Another reason that makes one hesitate to categorize Arvasi as an Islamist is that he
rebukes all Islamists in his time in and outside Turkey. He does so not because these
men were not Islamists enough but because they did exactly what the essence of pol-
itical Islam is: they politicized religion. It is remarkable, for instance, that Arvasi
scolded the leader of Turkey’s first Islamist political party Necmeddin Erbakan
although the latter ran a nationalist rhetoric.90 Arvasi thought that Islamist politicians
sought to exploit the appeal of Islam on Turkish people. Arvasi condemned them as
“parasites who try to stay alive by sucking religion’s blood.”91 Arvasi’s biting criti-
cism of Turkey’s Islamists went hand in hand with his salvoes against Islamists
abroad. Arvasi deplored non-Turkish Muslims’ understanding and practice of
Islam. He reprimands the followers of Wahhabism and such “religious perverts” as
Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, Ayatollahs of Iran for their abandonment
of “Su¨nnet ve Cemaat Yolu” 92 (People of the Sunna and the Community) represented
by Sirhindi, Abu Hanifa, Jalal al-Din al-Rumi, and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.93 Although at
least some of these “ancestors” were non-Turkish, Arvasi, deeply mired in the nation-
alist mindset, accorded praise to the Turkish nation for bringing them up.94 Here,
Arvasi admittedly took up the attitude of the TIS.95 Whenever Turks declined from
power, the Islamic world got miserable.96 Apparently, Arvasi, a fervent Turkish
nationalist, could not find any merit in any other Muslim nation.
It is very important to note that the novelty of the Turkish Islam Arvasi inadver-
tently ended up recreating vis-a`-vis the Turkish Islam project of the early secular
Republic. For whereas the aim of creating a Turkish Islam during the Republic
was not to give the fledgling nation a religious cause to unite around and mobilize
behind for, Arvasi renationalized Islam just for that purpose: to distinguish the
Turkish nation primarily from all other Muslim nations on a religious, not secular
basis by raising a claim in the name of Turks’ to the best and most accurate under-
standing and practice of Islam. While the secular Republic sought to cut ties with
Muslims abroad based, for instance, on a secular reason—the alleged Arab treason
during the WWI Arvasi explicitly rejected this secular ground.97 Instead, Arvasi
founded a religious ground for Turks’ superiority in relation to other Muslims:
Turks’ unparalleled understanding of Islam as opposed to woeful practices by all
the rest. He denied as utterly false the interpretation and practice of Islam in Qaddafi’s
Libya, in Egypt, in Iraq98 and longed for the day to come for the Turkish nation, “the
natural leader” and “the greatest hope of the Muslim World”99 to teach the rest of the
Muslims once more the “true”, “bid’ah free” Islam.
Furthermore, Arvasi would hardly qualify as an Islamist when he proposes
“national interests” as the guide for Turkish foreign policy. Arvasi wished more
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communication and cooperation between Muslim nations, “brothers in religion,” so
that they would protect each other.100 Yet, Arvasi says elsewhere that nations do not
have permanent enemies and friends and they think only their own social, cultural,
economic, and political interests.101 Arvasi seems to be caught in a dilemma of an
Islam-sensitive Turkish nationalist that, on the one hand, he says that he wishes for
closer ties between Muslim nations but, on the other hand, he advises each Muslim
nation to pursue their own “national interests,” which more often than not means pur-
suing national policies at the expense of other Muslim nations’ interests.
Finally, it is hard to imagine an Islamist who would discourage intermarriages
among different Muslim nations for fear of sullying his nation’s physical character-
istics. Arvasi, a nationalist, however, does. Surely, Arvasi rejects racism because
racism, he believes, is forbidden in Islam.102 However, one has to bring in what
Arvasi has called the concept of ic¸timai ırk (social race) to get to the core of his think-
ing on racism. He explains how ic¸timai ırk emerges
. . . From cultural, economic, and political unification, a “social race” emerges
as a sociological necessity . . . like it or not, today there is a French, British,
German, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese type in the world. Even if you do
not realize, there is on earth today a “social Turkish type” as well.103
In fear of losing the purity of typical Turkish social race, Arvasi takes a step forward
and discourages marriage with non-Turks
Children of a nation should, as much as possible, marry among themselves. The
children of mixed marriages remain bewildered among two different cultures . . .
Our bureaucrats, technocrats and workers, who went abroad for various reasons,
have returned Turkey with “foreign wives.” This way, in our country broke/unty-
pical generations such as “Turkish-German,” “Turkish-Anglo-Saxon,” “Turkish-
Persian” and “Turkish-Arab” have been increasing.104
The importance of nationalist ban on intermarriages cannot be exaggerated. As Hast-
ings pointed out, “freedom to marry across boundary lines is anti-nationalist ... inter-
marriage across ethnic borders strengthens territorial nationhood but threatens ethnic
nationhood and is anathema to ethnic nationalists. Intermarriage and nationalism
remain practical contraries.”105 Arvasi’s wish to limit marriages between Turks
and non-Turkish Muslims hardly makes him an Islamist. On that particular issue,
he remained an untainted nationalist.
Conclusion
Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi is one of the most significant yet of the least studied nationalist
intellectuals in Turkey. His views on various issues surrounding Turkish nationalism
remain unexplored primarily due to the TIS straitjacket. From an analysis of his views
in a systematic and critical way based on the entirety of his writings, Arvasi, a
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passionate Turkish nationalist and a devout Muslim, emerges as a strange bedfellow
with not only the MHP he unceasingly supported but also the TIS he tried to break
away from. As much as his nationalism in the orbit of Islam seems to have left
him at unease with the MHP, it did not allow him to become a blind exponent of
TIS either. Yet, Arvasi was neither an Islamist; he found his way out of the
tension between his two fealties, one to the nation and the other to the ummah, by
recreating a Turkish Islam on a religious ground. Therefore, Seyyid Ahmet
Arvasi’s Tu¨rk-I˙slam U¨lku¨su¨ added a religious layer to exclusive loyalty to the
nation that nationalism demands. This may bear testimony to the fact that the
Islamic turn in Turkish nationalism in the 1970s was neither a compromise
between Islam and nationalism nor Islamization of Turkish nationalism, as some
would like to have us believe.106 It seems that even in the hands of a devout
Muslim the combination of Islam and nationalism inadvertently ends up rendering
religion only another ground to exalt a particular nation.
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